Francesca Benati. “Funds” in case of mass torts: solidarity, efficiency, or just a fiction?
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Indeed, it has been observed that in the United States we are now seeing an evolution from
funds established as part of legally approved and administered collective actions to those taxed
and overseen by Congress to direct and administer funds created essentially without legal
restrictions. These are broad forms of transaction that nevertheless require some precautions
precisely to prevent them from becoming abuses. Moreover, Redish (2009) had already pointed
out the potential risks present in funds created within class actions. This leads to the question
of whether they are always a legitimate tool or whether they may instead represent a way for
the perpetrator of the wrongdoing to escape liability, partially repairing the damage on his terms
and protecting his interests. This is how the GCCF perceived that:
It represented an inadvertent incremental trend towards unlawful private resolution of mass
claims, whose resolution was created by a guilty defendant, unfettered by legal standards, and
administered by a heroic special administrator with unlimited and unreviewable discretion who
was also in the employment of the wrongdoer. (Mullenix, 2012, p. 558)
When we talk about fund efficiency, we can say that a fund is efficient only if it is well
constructed, it is necessary that the structure is flexible, that all relevant factors are evaluated
(Hensler, 2004). For example, concerning funds created ex-ante, it is necessary to:
1) understand all relevant factors driving the success of the accepted norm to be changed in the
new design; 2) make assumptions about the uncertainties emanating from the accepted norm3)
identify and disaggregate the variables of the new design; 4) identify stakeholders and their
preferences in reacting to the design5) select short- and long-term goals to achieve; 6design a
plan and 7) anticipate resistance; and 8) revise the plan and add continuous feedback loops.
(McGovern, 2004, p. 1375)
In any case, it is decisive to identify the actors, the damages, select the measures, design a plan
and an end, review the plan, but specifically what is important is to see the extent and duration
of the fund, the methods of financing, the categories that can be compensated, the criteria, the
methodology used for quantification, the relationship with civil liability and other methods of
compensation, whether it is possible to combine civil liability with the funds, the possibility of
reviewing the decision. It is known that in the case of 11 September the administrator had
almost absolute discretion, but this choice, although motivated by reasons of urgency and
simplification, does not seem advisable, especially when the funds are public.
Above all, an analysis of the cases in which it has been adopted shows how the quantification
of compensation is particularly delicate. Although de facto funds are often based on the
assumption of a waiver of the claim for full compensation in the absence of costs, expectations
uncertainties, they cannot even be translated into a symbolic instrument. Furthermore, the
definition of the damages baseline is important. For example, in the 9/11 fund, Feinberg had
set it at 250,000 dollars to be satisfactory for all parties involved. They should be examined:
(1) whether the procedures allow individuals the opportunity to state their case.
(2) whether the authorities are seen as neutral, impartial, honest, and principled in their
decision-making.